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Saving the Electronic Person
I. INTRODUCTION
Although hospital cyber security is highly regulated by the fed-
eral government, the current federal regulations fail to adequately
protect patients' electronic health information from large-scale data
breaches.1 Because of the widespread use of electronic medical rec-
ords in the United States, the increased threat of cyberattacks
should concern every American patient.2 In fact, the United States
Department of Health and Human Resources Health Care Industry
Cybersecurity Task Force has described the increased threat of
cyberattacks as a "key public health concern" in the twenty-first
century.3 Americans should be especially concerned about the
threat of hospital data breaches in the aftermath of the Equifax
data breach, which affected nearly half of all Americans.4 Now that
we as a country have an increased awareness about the conse-
quences of a large-scale cyberattack, we must turn our attention to
the threat of a hospital data breach.
Currently, hospital cyber security is governed by two pieces of
federal legislation that work in tandem to protect patient health
data: the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA)5 and the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act.6 Although federal legislation cur-
rently regulates the privacy, security, and confidentiality of our pa-
tient health information, the law must provide greater protections
over our most private and most sensitive data.7 This article pro-
poses a two-pronged approach that will result in greater protection
of our electronic medical records. First, this article argues that the
courts should recognize a fundamental right to our medical records'
privacy. Second, this article proposes revisions to the current
HIPAA laws that will provide for greater security of our electronic
medical information.
1. See HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, REPORT ON IMPROVING
CYBERSECURITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 1 (2017), https://www.phe.gov/preparedness/
planning/cybertf/documents/report20l7.pdff
2. See id.
3. Id. at 2.
4. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., EQUIFAX ONE YEAR LATER-AFTERMATH REPORT 1
(2018), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ITRCEquifax-Breach-
Aftermath-Report-2018-2.pdf:
5. HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
6. HITECH Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 17901-17953 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016 & Supp. V 2017).
7. See Jay Edelson & Aaron Lawson, Rethinking Healthcare Data Breach Litigation,




Hospital medical records are protected by HIPAA8 and the
HITECH Act.9 HIPAA laws require all health-care providers to pro-
tect all medical records' privacy and security.10 If a health-care pro-
vider violates patient confidentiality, then that provider may be
subject to a monetary penalty. Although these laws provide more
protection over electronic medical data than most other industries
in the United States, these laws have not adequately adapted to the
threat of large-scale data breaches to hospitals and health insur-
ance providers.12 This section will discuss the HIPAA and HITECH
statutory scheme and the increased threat of cyberattacks on hos-
pitals and health insurance providers in the United States.
A. HIPAA
HIPAA requires hospitals and health insurance providers to pro-
tect the confidentiality of all patient health data.13 HIPAA laws
apply to all medical records in both paper and electronic format.
14
Congress originally passed HIPAA in 1996
to improve the Medicare program under title XVIII of the So-
cial Security Act .... the medicaid program under title XIX of
such Act .... and the efficiency and effectiveness of the health
care system, by encouraging the development of a health infor-
mation system through the establishment of uniform stand-
ards and requirements for the electronic transmission of cer-
tain health information.
15
When initially passed, HIPAA's primary purpose was to expand
patient access to health care and health insurance in the United
States.16 In this original bill, however, Congress included a di-
rective to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
8. See HIPAA, 110 Stat. 1936.
9. See HITECH Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 17901-17953.
10. HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) (2012 & Supp. IV 2016 & Supp. V 2017).
11. HITECH Act, 42 U.S.C. § 17939.
12. R. Bradley McMahon, Note, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and GLBA
Privacy Provisions, Why Is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America?, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 625, 644 (2004).
13. HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d).
14. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2019).
15. HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d note (Purpose Section).
16. Donald M. Berwick & Martha E. Gaines, How HIPAA Harms Care, and How to Stop
It, 320 [J]AMA 229, 229 (2018).
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submit recommendations to Congress about the appropriate stand-
ards for protecting patient health information.17 The 1996 HIPAA
law also directed the Secretary of HHS to enact regulations to pro-
tect electronic health records.1 8 Although the privacy portion of the
law was more of an afterthought, this is the portion that has gained
notoriety amongst clinicians and patients.1 9 Thus, the modern era
of hospital privacy regulation was born.
In 2000, HHS promulgated the HIPAA Privacy and Security
Rules, and these rules were further modified in 2002.20 The HHS
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) enforces the Privacy and Security
Rules.21 These rules require "covered entities" to protect confiden-
tial patient information.22 "Covered entities" include health plans,
health-care clearinghouses, and health-care providers who trans-
mit health information electronically.23 In other words, a health
insurance plan, a hospital system, or an individual doctor's office
are all "covered entities" for the purposes of HIPAA laws.
24
HIPAA also applies to any "business associates" of the "covered
entities."25 According to the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, a
"business associate" assists a "covered entity" with "a function or
activity regulated by this subchapter, including claims processing
or administration, data analysis, processing or administration, uti-
lization review, quality assurance, patient safety activities .... bill-
ing, benefit management, practice management, and repricing."23
Additionally, a "business associate" must comply with all HIPAA
rules if it provides the "covered entity" with "legal, actuarial, ac-
counting, consulting, data aggregation .... management, adminis-
trative, accreditation, or financial services" and "the provision of the
service involves the disclosure of protected health information." 
27
17. HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2.
18. Id.
19. Berwick & Gaines, supra note 16, at 229.
20. JONATHAN I. EZOR, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN BUSINESS: LAWS & PRACTICES
145 (2012).
21. OCR, HIPAA Enforcement, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 25, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforeement/index.html.
22. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2019).








Passed in 2009, the HITECH Act created additional protections
for electronic patient information beyond the scope of HIPAA. 28 As
our society moved into the digital age, Congress realized the need
for stronger protections over our electronic medical records.29 The
HITECH Act also included provisions designed to encourage all hos-
pital systems to install electronic medical record systems and to
convert their medical records into an electronic format.
30
The HITECH Act created a penalty scheme if a covered entity
should accidentally disclose protected health information.31 Fines
under the HITECH Act range from $100 to $1,500,000.32 The pen-
alty scheme is based upon the severity of the privacy breach as well
as the culpability of the covered entity.33 For example, in a large
data breach, a covered entity can be subject to a fine of: $100 per
record34 for accidental disclosures;35 $1000 per record36 for disclo-
sures that occurred due to a reasonable cause rather than willful
neglect;37 $10,000 per record38 for disclosures due to willful ne-
glect;39 or $50,000 per record40 for disclosures due to willful neglect
if the entity fails to take corrective action following the wrongful
disclosure.41
The HITECH Act also includes reporting requirements mandat-
ing that the covered entity notify consumers after a data breach of
any size.42 The Act states:
[a] covered entity that accesses, maintains, retains, modifies,
records, stores, destroys, or otherwise holds, uses, or discloses
unsecured protected health information ... shall, in the case of
a breach of such information that is discovered by the covered
entity, notify each individual whose unsecured protected
health information has been, or is reasonably believed by the
28. HITECH Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 17901-17953 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016 & Supp. V 2017).
29. Arthur E. Peabody, Jr., The Evolution of HIPAA, in HEALTH CARE IT 141, 141 (Arthur
Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013).
30. HITECH Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 17901-17953.
31. Id. § 17939.
32. HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(3) (2012 & Supp. IV 2016 & Supp. V 2017).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 1320d-5(a)(3)(A).
35. Id. § 1320d-5(a)(1)(A).
36. Id. § 1320d-5(a)(3)(B).
37. Id. § 1320d-5(a)(1)(B).
38. Id. § 1320d-5(a)(3)(C).
39. Id. § 1320d-5(a)(1)(C)(i).
40. Id. § 1320d-5(a)(3)(D).
41. Id. § 1320d-5(a)(1)(C)(ii).
42. HITECH Act, 42 U.S.C. § 17932(a) (2012).
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covered entity to have been, accessed, acquired, or disclosed as
a result of such breach.
43
If the data breach includes more than 500 patient records, the
covered entity must then notify the individual consumers affected
by the breach as well as the Secretary of HHS and local media out-
lets.44
C. Current Limitations to HIPAA and the HITECH Act
Despite offering some of the strongest cyber protections of any
industry in the country, there are several limitations to the HIPAA
statutory scheme.45 As a result of these limitations, patient's elec-
tronic medical records are not being adequately protected.4 HIPAA
requires a state actor, such as the OCR, to bring a claim against the
covered entity in the event of a data breach-the federal regulations
do not create an individual cause of action for the victims of a
cyberattack.47 As a result, if a consumer's health data has been
compromised, the consumer only has two available avenues for re-
course, either: (1) file a complaint on the HHS website to prompt an
OCR investigation or (2) attempt to bring a tort or contract action
within the state or federal court system.
48
An OCR investigation into a data breach begins when a person
who suspects a HIPAA violation has occurred files a complaint with
the Secretary of HHS on the HHS website.49 After receiving the
patient complaint, the OCR then begins an investigation into the
alleged violation.50 If the OCR determines that the covered entity
did not comply with HIPAA laws, then the OCR will either impose
a fine upon the hospital51 or reach a settlement agreement with the
hospital.52 If the OCR assesses penalties against the covered entity,
then the covered entity pays that fine to the federal government
rather than the individual victims of the cyberattack.53 As a result,
an individual person will not recover any monetary damages at the
43. Id.
44. Id. § 17932(e)(2)-(4).
45. See McMahon, supra note 12, at 644.
46. See MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 170 (8th ed. 2013).
47. Id. at 172.
48. EZOR, supra note 20, at 167.
49. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.306 (2019); see also OCR, HIPAA What to Expect, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/filing-a-complaint/what-
to-expect/index.html?language-es.
50. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(c); see also OCR, HIPAA What to Expect, supra note 49.
51. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.402; see also OCR, HIPAA What to Expect, supra note 49.
52. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.416; see also OCR, HIPAA What to Expect, supra note 49.
53. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.424.
1 2020
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conclusion of an OCR investigation.54 Instead, that individual must
resort to tort and contract remedies in state and federal courts for
legal redress.
55
Additionally, personal health records created and stored on med-
ical devices and third-party applications are not included within
HIPAA's regulatory framework because these applications are not
considered "covered entities" for HIPAA purposes.5 Because these
medical devices and applications are neither "covered entities" nor
"business associates," HIPAA does not protect the valuable medical
information stored on these devices and within these applications.57
For example, many Americans rely on medical devices such as pace-
makers or glucose meters to track and store their medical data.58
Oftentimes, these devices do not fall under the HIPAA Rules; in-
stead, the Food and Drug Administration promulgates the appro-
priate security regulations.59 Health tracking applications such as
Fitbit, MyFitness Pal, or Apple Health have also become increas-
ingly popular.0 Interestingly, the default settings on an Apple
Watch automatically monitor the user's activity, including heart
rate and the number of steps taken throughout the day.6 1 Apple
Watch and iPhone users can also monitor their calorie intake, the
number of minutes spent meditating, and the number of hours
spent sleeping on Apple's Health application.6 2 Commentators have
expressed concern that "HIPAA and other federal and state privacy
laws are too focused on formal data custodians and data collected
in narrow contexts of treatment and medical research."6 3 As a re-
sult, there is an entire swath of patient medical information that is
unprotected by HIPAA; this valuable medical data is even more vul-
nerable to a cyberattack than the medical data stored by a hospi-
tal. 4 In addition to the structural limitations of the HIPAA and
54. See EZOR, supra note 20, at 167 (explaining that private litigation is one way for a
victim of a hospital cyberattack to seek recovery).
55. See id.
56. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, HIPAA and Protecting Health Information in the
21st Century, 320 [J]AMA 231, 232 (2018).
57. Id.
58. David J. Dykeman et al., Medical Devices in the Digital Age, in HEALTH CARE IT 83,
107 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013).
59. Id. at 107-08.
60. See Cohen & Mello, supra note 56, at 232.
61. Use the Health App on Your iPhone or iPod Touch, APPLE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://sup-
port.apple.com/en-us/HT203037.
62. Id.
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HITECH laws, hospitals have also become increasingly prone to
cyberattacks in the past decade.5
D. Recent Cyberattacks at Large Hospitals in the United States
The need for further legislation is made clear by the increased
likelihood of cyberattacks upon the health-care industry. According
to a report from the FBI Cyber Division, electronic medical records
can be sold on the black market for up to $50 per record.i In com-
parison, stolen social security numbers or credit card numbers are
only worth $1 on the black market.7 Like financial records, medi-
cal records often contain a patient's social security number and
credit card numbers.8 As a result, electronic health data is often
more valuable to hackers than financial records alone.69
In addition to credit card and social security numbers, electronic
medical records also contain valuable information about a patient's
health insurance.7 0 This data is extremely valuable to hackers be-
cause it can be used to buy medical equipment or prescription
drugs.7 1 Because doctors and nurses rely so heavily upon the infor-
mation within the patient's medical record to treat the patient,
medical identity theft raises serious concerns about the integrity of
the data in the medical record.7 2 A stolen medical identity can pose
a serious health risk if an unconscious patient has been rushed to
the emergency room and cannot verify his or her past medical or
prescription history.7 3 Because the patient cannot speak, the doc-
tors and nurses must instead rely upon the medical information
within the patient's chart.7 4 If the information in that patient's
chart has been corrupted due to medical identity theft, this creates
65. Lucy L. Thomson, Health Care Data Breaches and Information Security, in HEALTH
CARE IT 253, 253 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013).
66. FBI CYBER DIv., HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS AND MEDICAL DEVICES AT RISK FOR
INCREASED CYBER INTRUSIONS FOR FINANCIAL GAIN (2014), http://www.calhospital.org/sites/
main/files/file-attachments/dp attachment fbi alert.pdft
67. Id.
68. Brigid Sweeney, The Frightening New Frontier for Hackers: Medical Records, MOD.





72. See Scott Rupp, Why Do Hackers Want Medical Records?, ELECTRONIC HEALTH REP.





the dangerous possibility hat a doctor or nurse could accidently ad-
minister a dangerous dose of medication or begin a transfusion us-
ing the wrong blood type.
75
To further exacerbate the problem, the United States health-care
system is notoriously vulnerable due to legacy equipment and lim-
ited information technology budgets; thus, hospitals and health in-
surance providers are easy targets for cyberattacks.76 Additionally,
HIPAA and the HITECH Act have created incentives for hospitals
to install electronic medical record software, and the recent
"[e]fforts to modernize healthcare facilities to match the rapidly ad-
vancing technological landscape has created and exposed a host of
vulnerabilities that are actively targeted by malicious parties."
77
These additional vulnerabilities can be expected because "[o]ften,
technology is involved in various privacy problems, as it facilitates
the gathering, processing, and dissemination of information." 78 A
hospital's electronic medical records are no different: "[m]assive
data storage can also be vulnerable to cyberattacks and inadvertent
release of sensitive data."79  In describing the issues related to
cyberattacks at hospital systems, the Health Care Industry Cyber-
security Task Force, which was created by Congress as a part of the
Cybersecurity Act of 2015, states unequivocally: "cybersecurity at-
tacks disrupt patient care."
80
As a result, patient medical data has been particularly vulnera-
ble to cyberattacks.81 In 2018, nearly ten million medical records
were compromised.82 2015 was a record year for compromised
health records; over 121 million health-care records were compro-
mised.83 Since 2014, hackers have gained access to 161,080,500
health-care records.84
75. See id.
76. See HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 1.
77. Bach Nguyen, Note, Exploring Applications of Blockchain in Securing Electronic
Medical Records, 20 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 99, 100 (2017).
78. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 564 (2006).
79. Gostin et al., supra note 63, at 234.
80. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 1.
81. Id.
82. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT (2018),
https://www.idthefteenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-Year-
Aftermath FINAL V2 eombinedWEB.pdf (reporting that 9,927,798 health records were sto-
len in 2018).
83. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS (2015), https://
www.idthefteenter.org/images/breach/DataBreachReports_2015.pdf [hereinafter 2015 DATA
BREACH REPORTS].
84. See 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 82 (reporting 5,302,846
compromised health records in 2017 and 9,927,798 compromised health records in 2018);
IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS: 2016 END OF YEAR REPORT (2017),
https://www.idthefteenter.org/images/breach/2016/DataBreachReport_2016.pdf (reporting
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Even outside of the health-care space, data breaches are im-
portant matters of public concern. The 2017 Equifax data breach
exposed the private financial information of at least 148 million
Americans.8 5 The attack affected nearly 45% of American consum-
ers;8 1 those consumers must now actively monitor their credit re-
ports for decades in order to protect against identity theft.8 7 This
massive data breach received broad media coverage and increased
public awareness about the vulnerability of our private data as well
as the need for additional data security.88
Following the Equifax data breach, hospital data breaches should
start receiving greater national attention. Americans would be sur-
prised to learn that over 161 million patient health records have
been compromised since 2014.89 This number is greater than the
number of records stolen in the Equifax data breach.90 Hospital
data breaches are a serious and systemic problem that should be
receiving the same national media attention as the 2017 Equifax
hack.
The 2015 data breach of the nation's largest health insurance
provider, Anthem Inc. (Anthem), reveals the dramatic threat of
cyberattacks on our nation's hospitals and health insurance provid-
ers.91 Cyber criminals hacked into Anthem's network and stole the
medical records of over 79 million patients.92
In the aftermath of the Anthem hack, both the OCR and private
plaintiffs pursued claims against Anthem; the OCR investigated
the cyber breach,93 and consumers sought damages in a class action
15,942,053 compromised health records in 2016); 2015 DATA BREACH REPORTS, supra note
83 (reporting 121,629,812 compromised health records in 2015); IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR.,
DATA BRE$CH [SIC] REPORTS (2014), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/
DataBreachReports_2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 DATA BREACH REPORTS] (reporting
8,277,991 compromised health records in 2014).
85. EQUIFAX ONE YEAR LATER-AFTERMATH REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
86. See id.
87. McKay Smith & Garrett Mulrain, Equi-Failure: The National Security Implications
of the Equifax Hack and a Critical Proposal for Reform, 9 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 549, 551
(2018).
88. See id. at 552-53.
89. See 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 82; DATA BREACH
REPORTS: 2016 END OF YEAR REPORT, supra note 84; 2015 DATA BREACH REPORTS, supra note
83; 2014 DATA BREACH REPORTS, supra note 84.
90. EQUIFAX ONE YEAR LATER-AFTERMATH REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
91. Anthem to Pay Record $115M to Settle Lawsuits over Data Breach, NBC NEWS (June
23, 2017, 6:41 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/anthem-pay-record- 115m-set-
tle-lawsuits-over-data-breach-n776246 [hereinafter Anthem].
92. Id.
93. See Erica Teichert, Anthem to Pay $16M in Record Data Breach Settlement, MOD.




lawsuit in federal court.94 The Anthem case was the largest health-
care data breach in history, and consequently, its $16 million set-
tlement with HHS and the OCR was the largest HIPAA settlement
ever reached.95 The victims of the Anthem attack will not receive
this money; instead, the settlement will be paid to the United States
Treasury.9
In the civil suit, Anthem and the class-action plaintiffs reached a
civil settlement of $115 million. 97 When divided among the class
members, that settlement can only compensate the victims for two
years of credit monitoring services.98 If the class members had al-
ready enrolled with a credit monitoring service, then those plain-
tiffs may be eligible to receive a $50 cash payment.99 Despite ob-
taining one of the largest data breach settlements in history, it is
clear that neither a $50 payment nor two years of free credit moni-
toring services can adequately compensate the victims for this egre-
gious disclosure of their most private data.100 In fact, this pitiable
compensation is typical of the settlement awards received by data
breach victims.101 For example, the Equifax data breach victims
received a similar settlement for one year of credit monitoring.10 2
Oftentimes, the victims of medical identity theft must take steps
to resolve the identity theft on their own initiative.10 3 The resolu-
tion of a cyberattack can be both costly and time consuming.10 4
Thirty six percent of the victims of a cyberattack spent an average
of $18,660 to resolve the identity theft.10 5 These expenses include
the cost of identity protection, credit reporting, legal counsel, med-
ical services due to a lapse of health-care coverage, and reimburse-
ments to health-care providers to pay for the medical expenses in-
curred by imposters.106 Additionally, the resolution of a cybercrime
can be extremely time consuming.10 7 In fact, many patients report
94. Anthem, supra note 91.
95. Teichert, supra note 93.
96. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.424 (2019).
97. Teichert, supra note 93.
98. Id.
99. Anthem, supra note 91.
100. See Teichert, supra note 93.
101. See Smith & Mulrain, supra note 87, at 556.
102. See id. (noting that "the one-year protection plan fell far short of what was needed
for aggrieved customers").
103. PONEMON INST., 2013 SURVEY ON MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT 2-5 (2013), https://
www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2013 / 20Medical / 201dentity / 20Theft / 2ORe-
port%20FINAL%201 L.pdf
104. Id.
105. Id. at 4-5.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2.
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that it has taken a year or longer to resolve their case of medical
identity theft.108
E. Why We Need Additional Protection over Our Electronic Medi-
cal Records
Because of the increased threat of cyberattacks, the courts and
legislatures must proactively respond to this impending threat.109
The recent Anthem data breach "should be a call to arms" for all
hospitals and health insurance providers.110 Despite the severity of
the situation, "[s]ignificant players in the healthcare space, how-
ever, have not responded to these incidents with the urgency that,
we believe, the situation requires. They are instead content to cast
themselves as unwitting victims, even when best practices dictate
more proactive measures.111
Because electronic medical records contain a person's most pri-
vate data, we must work proactively to improve our hospital cyber
security.11 2 The Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force,
which was created by Congress as a part of the Cybersecurity Act
of 2015, explains that although a one-year identity protection plan
is standard across other industries following a cyberattack, this so-
lution is insufficient in the health-care space because "it does not
provide the patient with adequate protections based on the sensi-
tivity, value, and permanence of their health care data, which is
priceless."11
3
Electronic patient medical information is more valuable to hack-
ers than basic financial information alone.114 Electronic medical
records typically contain a patient's social security number as well
as credit card or banking information.11 5 These records, however,
also contain the most private and intimate details about that per-
son's life.116 They can contain details about patients' sexually trans-
mitted diseases, pregnancies, mental health records, and drug his-
tories.11 7 Some of this information may be embarrassing and could
108. Id.
109. Edelson & Lawson, supra note 7, at 106.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Thomson, supra note 65, at 264.
113. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 15 (emphasis
added).
114. FBI CYBER Div., supra note 66.
115. Sweeney, supra note 68.




even be used to unlawfully discriminate against individuals in the
workplace.11
8
For example, a railroad company was fined by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission for secretly conducting genetic test-
ing upon its employees to screen for diseases that could negatively
affect job performance.119 This example illustrates how an elec-
tronic medical record could potentially contain personal genetic in-
formation that could be used to discriminate against the patient in
the workplace. Furthermore, researchers increasingly use bi-
obanks storing "large sets of patient data and biological samples" in
attempts to understand and cure diseases.1 20 Advances in biobank
research, however, create confidentiality and privacy concerns if
the information in the biobank has not been properly de-identi-
fled.121 The genetic material stored in a biobank is literally the es-
sence of that individual person.122 As a result, we must make every
effort to protect this personal health information.
III. ANALYSIS
The law must intervene to help protect patients from the in-
creased threat of cyberattacks upon our electronic medical records.
This article proposes both a judicial and legislative solution to help
address the indignity that occurs when cyber criminals access and
steal a patient's valuable medical data. This author proposes a ju-
dicial and legislative solution to help combat the increased problem
of hospital cyberattacks. First, this author proposes that the
United States Supreme Court recognize a fundamental right to the
privacy of our medical records based upon prior Supreme Court de-
cisions regarding information privacy and medical decision making.
Additionally, this article proposes that the OCR should modify all
"addressable" standards within the HIPAA Security Rules to be "re-
quired" for all large covered entities.
1 23
118. EZOR, supra note 20, at 102.
119. Genetic Discrimination, NAT'L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/
about-genomics/policy-issues/Genetic-Discrimination (last updated Sept. 24, 2019).
120. HALL ET AL., supra note 46, at 276.
121. Heather L. Harrell & Mark A. Rothstein, Biobanking Research and Privacy Laws in
the United States, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 106, 108-09 (2016).
122. See Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Comment, Genetic Information and Property The-
ory, 87 Nw. L. REV. 1037, 1071 (1993) ("A person's DNA existed from the moment he began
to exist as an individual. In addition, the individual has no control over the specific infor-
mation encoded in his DNA that determines his unique characteristics or traits; this infor-
mation also existed intact at the time the person began to exist.").
123. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)-(d) (2019).
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A. Proposed Judicial Solution: Affording Federal Constitutional
Protection to Patient Medical Records
As the threat of cyberattacks increases, HIPAA laws no longer
adequately protect our patient health information.124 Additionally,
state and federal governments have increasingly begun to accumu-
late and store both identified and de-identified health information
for reporting and research purposes.125 Of the 6,210 hospitals in
the United States, 1,180 of those hospitals are public hospitals that
are operated by either state or federal governments.12  Thus, gov-
ernment entities have increasingly begun to aggregate, collect, and
store our electronic medical data.
127
Some patients could turn to the United States Constitution to
help protect their private medical records. This article proposes the
creation of a fundamental right to the privacy of our medical rec-
ords. This proposed fundamental privacy right is derived from pre-
vious Supreme Court decisions discussing information privacy
128
and medical privacy, 129 as well as the common- law doctrines of im-
plied breach of contract, assault, and battery.130 A fundamental pri-
vacy right to medical records would afford patients the security of
knowing that their medical records and, ultimately, their medical
decisions are protected under the Constitution.
131
124. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 1.
125. Wendy K. Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for Health Information
Privacy, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 975, 976 (2016).
126. AM. HOsp. ASS'N, FAST FACTS ONUS HOSPITALS (2019), https://www.aha.org/system/
files/2019-01/2019-aha-hospital-fast-facts.pdf.
127. Mariner, supra note 125, at 976.
128. See generally NASAv. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (discussing the possible con-
stitutional right to the privacy of private health information stored by the government in an
electronic database); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (establishing a possible consti-
tutional right to information privacy in another case involving the storage of electronic health
data by a state government).
129. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997) (declining to es-
tablish a fundamental right to obtain a physician-assisted suicide); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (establishing a fundamental right to privacy in medical
decision making).
130. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 193-94, 210-11 (1890) (explaining how the common-law doctrines of breach of
contract, assault, and battery lead to the creation of a tort cause of action for breach of pri-
vaey).
131. See generally Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600, 605 (noting the "genuine concern" that private
health data may be inadvertently released when "vast amounts of personal information" is
stored "in computerized data banks or other massive government files").
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1. A Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy
Based upon the constitutional right to information privacy dis-
cussed in Whalen v. Roe132 and NASA v. Nelson,133 the Supreme
Court should recognize the existence of a constitutional right to in-
formation privacy. This constitutional right to information privacy
should also protect the privacy of our electronic medical records. In
Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court first recognized
that a constitutional right to information privacy may exist.134 The
plaintiffs in this case challenged a New York state law that created
a database that stored the names and addresses of all patients us-
ing Schedule II drugs for both medical and nonmedical purposes.135
The plaintiffs alleged that the storage of their personal medical in-
formation within the database violated their constitutional privacy
rights.136 The Court held that the right to privacy protects at least
two different interests: the right to avoid disclosure of personal mat-
ters and a right to independence in decision making.137 The Court
further recognized that the storage of this medical information in
the state database presents
a genuine concern that the information will become publicly
known and that it will adversely affect their reputations. This
concern makes some patients reluctant to use, and some doc-
tors reluctant to prescribe, such drugs even when their use is
medically indicated. It follows, they argue, that the making of
decisions about matters vital to the care of their health is inev-
itably affected by the statute. Thus, the statute threatens to
impair both their interest in the nondisclosure of private infor-
mation and their interest in making important decisions inde-
pendently. 138
Because the state had provided adequate protections over the in-
formation stored in the database, the Court ultimately held that
this database was constitutional.139 The Court acknowledged, how-
ever, that it was "not unaware of the threat of privacy implicit in
132. 429 U.S. at 605.
133. 562 U.S. at 138.
134. 429 U.S. at 591-93.
135. Id. at 591.
136. Id. at 599-600.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 600.
139. Id. at 603-04.
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the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in com-
puterized data banks or other massive government files." 140 And
the right of a government entity "to collect and use such data for
public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statu-
tory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures."141 Addi-
tionally, the Court acknowledged that this duty to avoid the unwar-
ranted disclosure of the plaintiffs' private medical information "ar-
guably ha[d] its roots in the Constitution." 142 Although the Court
did not ultimately create a constitutional duty mandating that gov-
ernment entities must protect the privacy of the electronic infor-
mation within their possession, it certainly suggested that such a
duty could exist.143 The lower federal courts have since read Whalen
to create a duty to safeguard the private information that is en-
trusted to government entities.
144
The Supreme Court further hinted that this right to information
privacy may exist in NASA v. Nelson.145 In this case, National Aer-
onautics and Space Administration (NASA) employees claimed that
the government violated their constitutional privacy interests in
avoiding the wrongful disclosure of personal matters through the
administration of NASA's standard employee background investi-
gation.146 The challenged background investigation included ques-
tions about prior treatment for illegal drug use.147 Writing for the
majority, Justice Alito stated: "[w]e assume, without deciding, that
the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in
Whalen."148 The Court observed that the "remote possibility" of dis-
closure of this private information "does not undermine the Privacy
Act's substantial protections." 149 The Court ultimately held "that
the Government's inquiries do not violate a constitutional right to
informational privacy."150 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
wrote separately to clarify that "[a] federal constitutional right to
'informational privacy' does not exist."151 Based upon the holdings
in Whalen v. Roe and NASA v. Nelson, courts should recognize the




144. Solove, supra note 78, at 518, 530.




149. Id. at 158.
150. Id. at 159.
151. Id. at 160 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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right to information privacy and should include the privacy of our
electronic medical information within that constitutional right.
2. A Constitutional Right to Dignity in Medical Decision
Making
Whalen v. Roe152 and NASA v. Nelson53 support the argument
that a constitutional right to information privacy should exist,
1 54
and furthermore, the Supreme Court decisions in Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health55 and Washington v. Glucks-
berg156 suggest that the Constitution protects the right to freedom
in our health-care decisions.1 57 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that a patient possesses a fundamental privacy right to ter-
minate medical treatment at the end of life. 158 In this case, the
Court considered whether the parents of an incompetent young
woman living in a persistent vegetative state could make the deci-
sion to terminate their daughter's life support.1 59 The challenged
Missouri state law required a heightened showing of an incompe-
tent person's wishes whenever a surrogate makes the decision to
terminate life support on an incompetent person's behalf.16 0 Alt-
hough the Court ultimately found that the patient's as applied chal-
lenge must fail, the Court included statements about the individual
right to autonomy in medical decision making.61 The majority
opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, stated, "we assume
that the United States Constitution would grant a competent per-
son a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration
and nutrition."16 2 Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion
where she clarified that:
[r]equiring a competent adult to endure such procedures
against her will burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and free-
dom to determine the course of her own treatment. Accord-
ingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal
152. 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
153. 562 U.S. at 138.
154. Id.; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
155. 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
156. 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997).
157. Id.; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
158. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
159. Id. at 265.
160. Id. at 268-69.
161. Id. at 279.
162. Id.
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decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial de-
livery of food and water.113
Justice Brennan's dissent discussed the importance of dignity in
medical decision making. 1 4 Justice Brennan described the decision
of whether to continue medical treatment at the end of life as both
"difficult and personal."16 5 Justice Brennan explained "that [the
young woman] has a fundamental right to be free of unwanted ar-
tificial nutrition and hydration," and, as a result, she "is entitled to
choose to die with dignity." 1  Thus, he would have found that the
challenged Missouri law could not pass the strict scrutiny test.
1 7
In the landmark physician-assisted suicide case of Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Court considered "how best to protect dignity and
independence at the end of life."16 8 In fact, in her concurrence, Jus-
tice O'Connor advocated for what is known as the principle of dou-
ble effect: "a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and
who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining
medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering,
even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening
death."169 Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and explained
that the right to refuse medical treatment at the end of life "is an
aspect of a far broader and more basic concept of freedom that is
even older than the common law. This freedom embraces not
merely a person's right to refuse a particular kind of unwanted
treatment, but also her interest in dignity .... ,170
The Cruzan and Glucksberg decisions support the argument that
the Constitution protects our freedom and individual liberty in de-
cision making regarding our personal health-care choices. This
freedom in medical decision making includes the decision of whom
we choose to share our most confidential medical information with.
A hospital breaks patient confidentiality whenever its data is
breached. Whenever a hospital data breach occurs, a hospital thus
breaks patient confidentiality. The hospital data breach is a viola-
tion of the patient's personal liberty because that patient no longer
controls who has access to his or her medical information. Thus, a
163. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. See id. at 302 (Brennan, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 303.
166. Id. at 302.
167. Id.
168. 521 U.S. 702, 716 (1997).
169. Id. at 736-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 743 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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data breach violates the constitutional principle of freedom in med-
ical decision making established in Cruzan and Glucksberg because
it takes away the patient's choice of deciding who gets to learn about
his or her most private health information.
3. A Constitutional Right to the Privacy of Our Patient Med-
ical Records
Although many of the Justices spoke of human dignity and indi-
vidual privacy rights in the Cruzan and Glucksberg opinions, Cru-
zan recognized, as a facet of those privacy rights, a "constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment."171 This liberty interest is based upon the common-law doc-
trine of informed consent.172 The Court explained that "[a]t com-
mon law, even the touching of one person by another without con-
sent and without legal justification was a battery."173 As a part of
this common-law "notion of bodily integrity,"174 the patient has a
right "not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment."175
Conversely, the Glucksberg Court held that a patient does not
have a fundamental privacy right to a physician-assisted suicide.176
The Glucksberg Court performed a historical analysis and deter-
mined that the law has never recognized a common-law right to
commit suicide or to assist another person in committing suicide. 
177
The Court noted that "for over 700 years, the Anglo-American com-
mon-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both
suicide and assisting suicide."178 As a result, the Court declined to
recognize an individual privacy right to physician-assisted sui-
cide.179
Writing for the majority in Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist
distinguished the Cruzan case from the matter before the Court,
explaining that "[t]he right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not
simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy."
180
Instead, the fundamental right recognized in Cruzan was based
upon "the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery,
171. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
172. Id. at 269-70.
173. Id. at 269.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 270.
176. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
177. Id. at 710-16.
178. Id. at 711.
179. Id. at 735.
180. Id. at 725.
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and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent
with this Nation's history and constitutional traditions." 18 1 The
Court acknowledged that "[t]he decision to commit suicide with the
assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the
decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never en-
joyed similar legal protection." 
182
The courts should recognize that the Constitution protects a fun-
damental right to the privacy of our patient medical records. Alt-
hough the common-law privacy right is a relatively new develop-
ment in the history of the common law, courts can rely on the more
ancient doctrines of implied breach of contract, assault, and battery
as the source of this fundamental right.18 3 By relying upon these
well-established common-law doctrines, the fundamental right to
privacy of our medical records is thus rooted in "this Nation's his-
tory and constitutional traditions."
1 84
The common-law privacy right, which is distinct from the consti-
tutional privacy right recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut,18 5 Roe
v. Wade,186 Cruzan v. Director, and Missouri Department of
Health,187 was first discerned in the classic Harvard Law Review
article written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy.188 Warren and Brandeis argued that the advances of mod-
ern technology during the industrial age created the necessity for a
common-law privacy right.18 9 Warren and Brandeis examined a va-
riety of common-law cases and perceived that the right to privacy
existed within the common-law doctrines of assault and battery,190
property law, 191 slander, 192 libel, 193 breach of an implied contractual
term, 194 and breach of confidence. 195
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 193-94, 210-11 (explaining how
the common-law doctrines of breach of contract, assault, and battery lead to the creation of
a tort cause of action for breach of privacy).
184. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
185. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
186. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
187. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
188. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 213.
189. Id. at 195-96.
190. Id. at 193-94.
191. Id. at 204.
192. Id. at 197.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 210-11.
195. Id. at 207-08.
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Following the publication of The Right to Privacy in 1890, the
courts slowly began to recognize a cause of action based upon the
invasion of privacy.196 The Restatement of Torts first recognized a
tort cause of action for the interference with privacy in 1939.197 In
1960, Dean William Prosser revisited The Right to Privacy in his
own famous law review article discussing the right to privacy.198 In
this article, Dean Prosser examined the evolution of the common-
law privacy right since the publication of The Right to Privacy in
1890.199 After examining hundreds of judicial decisions across the
country, Dean Prosser concluded that the right to privacy had fully
emerged as a common-law cause of action in the United States.20
0
Although the common-law privacy doctrine may seem to be the
most fitting common law analogy for the recognition of a fundamen-
tal right to the privacy of our medical records, the right of privacy
is only a recent common law development;20 1 as a result, this com-
mon-law privacy right cannot be considered part of the history and
traditions of our country. Instead, the courts must rely upon an
even older common-law doctrine that is rooted in the history and
traditions of our country to find a new fundamental right that pro-
tects the privacy of our medical records.202
The Right to Privacy cited to the common-law doctrines of implied
breach of contract, assault, and battery in support of its authors'
newly proposed common-law privacy right.2°3 Today, courts can
rely upon these same three common-law doctrine in support of a
fundamental right to the privacy of our medical information.
Warren and Brandeis cited the common-law doctrine of implied
contractual terms in support of their proposed privacy right.
20 4
Similarly, the common-law doctrine of implied contractual terms
can also be used to establish a new fundamental right to the privacy
of our medical records. Enforcing the implied terms in a contract
has been a feature of the common law since the time of the founding;
in 1807, the United States Supreme Court defined an implied con-
196. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960).
197. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (Am. Law Inst. 1939).
198. Prosser, supra note 196, at 383-88.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 422.
201. See id. at 383-388 (describing how the courts slowly began to recognize a privacy
cause of action in tort law following the publication of The Right to Privacy in 1890).
202. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (noting that the Court begins
its inquiry, "as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal tradi-
tions, and practices").
203. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 193-94, 210-11.
204. Id. at 210-11.
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tract as "that which the law (to prevent a failure of justice) pre-
sumes the parties to have made, where they have failed to make an
express contract for themselves; and courts will vary the terms of
such implied contract according to the principles of natural jus-
tice."205 Contract law is a particularly appropriate analogy in the
context of medical records because recent scholars have explained
that the law of contracts is necessary to understand the relationship
between a doctor and a patient.206 The doctor-patient relationship
"is contractual in two important ways: it is a voluntary relationship
and once initiated, it is subject to the application of principles from
the law of contracts in the determination of the rights and duties of
the parties."2
07
Although the common law may not have recognized a cause of
action for the breach of confidentiality in an individual doctor-pa-
tient relationship at the time of the founding,208 the large-scale col-
lection, aggregation, and storage of electronic medical records in
modern times presents a unique set of challenges that did not exist
before the invention of computers. Because federal laws heavily in-
centivize and encourage the use of electronic medical records, pa-
tients have no choice but to accept that their patient information
will be stored electronically by large hospital systems.209 Because
patients have no control over hospital cyber-security measures, pa-
tients also must accept that their electronic medical information
may be vulnerable to cyberattacks. As a result, patients have no
choice but to trust that their hospitals will keep their private infor-
mation safe from a data breach.
Because of the disproportionate relationship between the patient
and the hospital, courts should recognize that an implied term ex-
ists within this contractual relationship. That implied term would
include a promise from the hospital to protect the patient's medical
records from a cyberattack. Hospital systems would thus break
that implied promise every time that a patient's confidential medi-
cal record has been compromised in a data breach.
205. French's Ex'x v. Bank of Columbia, 8 U.S. 141, 144 (1807).
206. Joseph M. Healey, Jr. & Kara L. Dowling, Controlling Conflicts of Interest in the Doc-
tor-Patient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 42
MERCER L. REV. 989, 999 (1991).
207. Id.
208. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 135 (2007).
209. See Arthur E. Peabody, Jr., Electronic Health Records: Technology Standards and
Incentives for Meaningful Use, in HEALTH CARE IT 177, 197 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013).
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The modern-day contract between the hospital system and the
patient is of greater financial significance than the contract be-
tween a local doctor and a patient at the time of the founding. That
original relationship was based upon trust and personal interac-
tions, whereas the medical system today has been described as
more impersonal and less humane."210 Interestingly, some authors
argue that the introduction of health information technology, in-
cluding electronic medical records software, is partially responsible
for the "depersonalization of health care."21 1 Because the practice
of medicine has changed significantly since 1791, courts should rec-
ognize the existence of an implied contract term to secure all patient
health records within the context of the modern-day doctor-patient
relationship.
Warren and Brandeis also relied upon the evolution of the law of
assault and battery in support of their newly proposed privacy
right.212 The Right to Privacy discussed how the common-law doc-
trine of battery, which was designed to protect a person from phys-
ical injury, subsequently led to the creation of assault law.21 3 As-
sault law evolved from the law of battery under the theory that as-
sault law protected an individual from the threat of a physical in-
jury rather than the actual physical injury itself.214 The authors
thus argued that assault law had led to the inevitable creation of
"the right to be let alone" and their newly proposed privacy right.
215
Similarly, the cyberattacks upon our electronic medical records
can be compared to the common-law doctrines of assault and bat-
tery. Warren and Brandeis explained in The Right to Privacy that
battery and assault law evolved to protect every individual's right
to bodily integrity.216 Although electronic medical records are cer-
tainly intangible records, these records contain some of the most
intimate details about a person's tangible, physical body.21 7 If the
law is prepared to accept assault and battery as an affront to our
physical personhood, then the common-law concepts of assault and
battery should also apply to our electronic personhood. With the
recent scientific breakthroughs in genetic testing, biobanks, and
210. James E. Bailey, Does Health Information Technology Dehumanize Health Care?, 11
AM. MED. ASS'N J. ETHICS 181, 181 (2011).
211. Id.
212. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 193-94.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 193.
216. Id. at 193-94.
217. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific
Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 88-89 (2012).
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gene therapy, our electronic medical records contain more detailed
intangible information about our tangible, physical bodies.218 As a
result, a cyberattack upon a hospital system is more than a simple
data breach. It is a digital assault upon our electronic personhood.
Thus, courts can analogize to the ancient common-law doctrines of
assault and battery to establish a new fundamental right to the pri-
vacy of our medical records.
In addition to federal constitutional protection, patients can also
look to the constitutions of their respective states for additional pro-
tection over their electronic medical records. Each individual state
has its own state constitution that can provide greater protections
for individual liberties than the federal Constitution alone.219 The
federal Constitution is a floor not a ceiling.220 And state constitu-
tions may provide greater individual rights than the federal Consti-
tution.221 In his often-quoted law review article discussing the
power of the state constitutions, Justice Brennan opined "[s]tate
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections
often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of federal law."222 As a result, absent precedent from
the United States Supreme Court creating a fundamental right to
the privacy of our electronic medical records, the state supreme
courts can intervene and decide that patients have a fundamental
right to the protection of their electronic medical records.223 State
courts may be even more eager to create this new fundamental pri-
vacy right if the citizens of that particular state have been espe-
cially victimized by large-scale data breaches.
B. Proposed Legislative Solution: Making All Addressable
HIPAA Standards Required for Large Covered Entities
Congress and the OCR can also protect the privacy of our medical
records through the implementation of legislative reform. Because
of the devastating consequences of a medical data breach, Congress
and HHS should adopt additional regulations to help monitor and
218. Id.
219. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 114 (2009).
220. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Con-
stitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550 (1986).
221. Id.
222. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
223. See supra notes 219-222 and accompanying text.
1 2020
Duquesne Law Review
prevent cyberattacks. Congress and HHS must create stronger pro-
tections of our valuable patient health data through federal legisla-
tion.2
24
Currently, the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules permit a de-
gree of flexibility for covered entities; however, HHS should ensure
that large covered entities adopt even stricter security standards.
225
This article proposes that all "addressable" standards in the HIPAA
Security Rule should be "required" standards for all large covered
entities. This solution will also include a provision that allows
smaller independent doctor's offices to continue to make case-by-
case determinations of whether to implement HIPAA's addressable
standards.226
Many other authors have offered suggestions and ideas for re-
forming hospital cyber security. These solutions have ranged from
monumental changes, such as large scale privacy reform in the
United States modeled after the European Union's General Data
Protection Regulation,227 to incremental changes, such as requiring
encryption of all health-care data.
228
Student author, Ryan Garner, has recognized that the lack of
data encryption at American hospitals poses a major threat to cyber
security.229 He offered a solution to amend the HIPAA Security
Rule to change data encryption from an "addressable" standard to
a "required" standard.230 In fact, Garner's suggestion helped to
spark this author's proposal. This paper builds upon Garner's un-
derstanding of the need for additional security measures in order to
224. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 78, at 564 (explaining that " [t]he way to address privacy
problems is to regulate these activities"); Edelson & Lawson, supra note 7, at 106 (urging
that the inaction of hospitals and health insurance providers to take proactive measures to
prevent data breaches "requires legislators and the courts to intervene before it is too late");
HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that "health
care cyber security is a key public health concern that needs immediate and aggressive at-
tention").
225. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notifi-
cation Rules Under the HITECH and GINA Acts, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5589 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164) (noting that "the requirements of the Security Rule were
designed to be technology neutral and scalable to all different sizes of covered entities and
business associates); see also JOHN J. TRINCKES, JR., THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO COMPLYING
WITH THE HIPAA/HITECH PRIVACY AND SECURITY RULES 167 (2013) (explaining that "the
HIPAA Security Rule is designed to be scalable across mall and large covered entities").
226. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)-(d) (2019).
227. Elizabeth A. Brasher, Note, Addressing the Failure ofAnonymization: Guidance from
the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 209,
251-53 (2018).
228. Ryan L. Garner, Note, Evaluating Solutions to Cyber Attack Breaches of Health Data:
How Enacting a Private Right of Action for Breach Victims Would Lower Costs, 14 IND.
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appropriately protect our nation's electronic medical records.231
This paper also builds upon Garner's recognition that the current
version of HIPAA does not adequately protect our electronic medi-
cal records, and one way to address that deficiency is to build upon
HIPAA's existing framework to create additional cyber-security
protections .232
Readers may be surprised to learn that HIPAA actually offers
some degree of flexibility for the enforcement of the HIPAA stand-
ards: although many of the standards found in the HIPAA Security
Rules are "required," some of the standards are "addressable." 
233 If
a standard is "addressable" rather than "required," the covered en-
tity may take the following factors into account when deciding
whether to implement the security standard: "(i) The size, complex-
ity, and capabilities of the covered entity or business associate. (ii)
The covered entity's or the business associate's technical infrastruc-
ture, hardware, and software security capabilities. (iii) The costs of
security measures. (iv) The probability and criticality of potential
risks to electronic protected health information." 234 This flexibility
leads to a troubling result because it gives individual entities the
ability to decide whether to adopt certain provisions of HIPAA's Se-
curity and Privacy Rules.235 Currently, all covered entities are per-
mitted to make a case-by-case determination over whether to im-
plement the addressable HIPAA standards.23
HIPAA would offer stronger cyber-security protections if HHS
amended all the "addressable" security standards to now be "re-
quired" standards for all large covered entities.237 HHS considered,
debated, and approved the addressable and required security
standards when it initially promulgated HIPAA's Security Rule in
2000.238 Professor Glenn Cohen of Harvard Law School and Profes-
sor Michelle Mello of Stanford Law School explain that despite the
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[o]ver time, however, HIPAA has proved surprisingly func-
tional. Particularly after being amended in the 2009 HITECH
(ie, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clin-
ical Health) Act to address challenges arising from electronic
health records, HIPAA has accomplished its primary objective:
making patients feel safe giving their physicians and other
treating clinicians sensitive information while permitting rea-
sonable information flows for treatments, operations, research,
and public health purposes.
239
Because HIPAA already provides some protections over patient
medical records, it will be a quicker and more efficient solution to
build off the existing architecture of HIPAA and the HITECH Act
rather than creating an entirely new framework for data privacy in
the United States.
Although this relatively straightforward solution may not be as
comprehensive as a massive overhaul of United States data privacy
laws, it has the benefit of being more likely to occur. Because leg-
islative reform takes time, a more moderate proposal may be the
quickest way to affect actual change of hospitals and health insur-
ance providers. This proposal does not preclude others from sug-
gesting more impactful and lasting changes, but this solution has
the benefit of offering a realistic short-term solution that will have
a more immediate impact over the security of our electronic medical
records.
This proposal also has the benefit of considering the size and re-
sources of an individual provider or small physician group. One
criticism of HIPAA is that "[t]he specifics are largely left to the pro-
vider and their capabilities and budget, which is the reason why
there are such broad discrepancies in security across the healthcare
industry."240 When the OCR passed the HIPAA Security Rule, it
understood that a one-size-fits-all solution would not work for every
hospital and every health insurance provider in the country.241 In
fact, "the HIPAA Security Rule is designed to be scalable across
small and large covered entities. Since each covered entity is dif-
ferent, the rules were not developed to be so specific that a covered
entity does not have the latitude to decide how best to meet the re-
quirements.242 Although it may have been desirable to leave some
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discretion up to the individual health-care providers when the Pri-
vacy and Security Rules were originally passed, the information age
has left patients' electronic medical records vulnerable to cyberat-
tacks. The Equifax and Anthem data breaches prove that Congress
can no longer depend upon the individual hospitals and health in-
surance providers to adequately protect the sensitive medical infor-
mation that their patients have entrusted to them.
Under this proposal, changing the HIPAA standards from ad-
dressable to required will depend upon the entity's size. HIPAA
requirements already vary depending upon the covered entity's
size. This proposal is a continuation of that framework. This solu-
tion is both realistic and practical because it accomplishes the goal
of creating greater protection over the electronic medical records at
the large United States hospitals that hold the greatest proportion
of patient data without imposing overly exacting monetary require-
ments upon smaller local practices. This solution follows the exist-
ing HIPAA framework by considering the varying resources and ca-
pabilities of health-care providers across the country.243 Small in-
dividual providers will not be forced to adopt the same degree of
sophisticated technological infrastructure to protect against cyber-
crimes as a large health-care conglomerate. This solution considers
that a small, independent doctor's office has different constraints
than a large covered entity such as Anthem, the largest health in-
surer in the country.
244
The increasing prevalence of cyberattacks on hospitals and
health insurance companies is a serious threat to all American pa-
tients.245 The frequency and severity of these attacks has increased
dramatically in recent years.24 The public backlash following the
Equifax data breach demonstrates the public concern regarding the
security of our personal data stored in the electronic files of our na-
tion's banks, hospitals, educational institutions, and government
entities.247 Although other authors have called for more dramatic
reform of data privacy laws in America, these proposals are outside
of the scope of this article.248 Instead, this article proposes a modest
solution to the immediate problem: cyber criminals compromise our
electronic medical data on a daily basis. Although this proposal is
modest, it is a first step towards assuring Americans that their
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medical records are properly safeguarded by the institutions that
they are entrusting with the custody of their electronic medical rec-
ords.
IV. CONCLUSION
The threat of a large-scale data breach of our electronic health
records should be a serious concern for all Americans. The pro-
tected health information that is collected, stored, and aggregated
at hospitals and health insurance providers nationwide is ex-
tremely valuable to hackers because these records not only contain
financial information such as social security numbers and credit
card numbers,249 but these records also contain some of the most
private and intimate details about our medical care.250 As a result,
the law must provide greater protections over our most valuable
patient information. This article has offered both judicial and leg-
islative solutions for how we can start to combat this problem and
protect our most private patient information from the threat of a
cyberattack.
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